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Mitrovica is a dying town. Many other towns across South Eastern
Europe are suffering from the consequences of deindustrialization and un-
resolved ethnic tensions, but nowhere else has the combination produced a
social and economic crisis as severe as in the divided town of Mitrovica.
Mitrovica used to be a one-company town built around the Trepca
mining and metallurgy complex, once a flagship company of Kosovo em-
ploying close to 22,000 people. Today, production has collapsed com-
pletely, and employment in Trepca has dropped to about 3,100 individuals
receiving stipends or salaries for doing maintenance and cleanup work. The
one-company town was left without its company.
Ethnically motivated expulsions after the conflict in 1999 left Mi-
trovica divided between an Albanian-majority part south of the Ibar River,
with 65,012 inhabitants, and a Serb-majority part north of the River, a con-
fined 1.5 square kilometer area that contains a Serb majority of 13,402 and
an Albanian minority of 2,100.1 A total of 2,583 families have filed claims
for displacement from their homes and apartments on both sides of the
river.2 There has basically been no progress on returns or property restitu-
tion in Mitrovica since the conflict.
The private sector both north and south of the Ibar River is too weak
to make up for the dramatic collapse in employment. In the South, the pri-
vate sector employs 5,400 individuals and generates about 43% of monthly
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I. EUROPEAN STABILITY INITIATIVE, A POST-INDUSTRIAL FUTURE?: ECONOMY AND SOCIETY IN
MITROVICA AND ZVECAN, BACKGROUND PAPER FOR WILTON PARK CONFERENCE 2 (Jan. 30-Feb. I,
2004), at http://www.esiweb.org/pdf/esimitrovica-economy-id l.pdf [hereinafter A POST-
INDUSTRIAL FUTURE?].
2. Housing and Property Directorate in Kosovo, Housing and Property Claims Commission,
Claims by Municipality, available at www.hpdkosovo.org/statistics_mun.asp (last visited Nov. 13,
2004).
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cash income.3 This yields an average monthly per capita cash income of
thirty-eight euros. 4 Some families receive additional incomes from rent
paid by the international community and remittances from the Albanian
diaspora abroad. The existing private sector is predominantly trade, con-
struction, and basic services. A study by the Ministry of Labour and Social
Welfare found that 72.5% of microenterprises are family based and nearly
half are "on the survival level."
5
The economy in North Mitrovica is entirely dependent on outside sub-
sidies. It is a bubble economy by all means. Nearly 64% of monthly cash
income derives from direct budget transfers from Belgrade, which pay the
salaries of 4,100 health, education, and university staff as well as pensions
and social assistance. 6 The Kosovo budget contributes nearly 22%, half of
which is spent on salaries for the civil service and the other half on social
transfers including pensions, social assistance, and stipends to former
Trepca workers. 7 These outside subsidies yield an average monthly per
capita income of 102 euros.8 Of this, only 14% is generated by the econ-
omy. 9 Very little is produced in North Mitrovica, and there are no
investments.
In 1991, Mitrovica was a multiethnic town with a population of
82,837 Albanians, 10,698 Serbs and Montenegrins, and 11,350 Bosnians
and Roma. 10 Mitrovica was proud of its multiethnic football team-once
making it into Yugoslavia's first league, a thriving music scene, and the
Trepca Company.
Mitrovica has become a symbol of division, with barbed wire along
the Ibar River separating the Serb North from the Albanian South. Today,
3. A POST-INDUSTRIAL FUTURE?, supra note 1, at 5 tbl.6; EUROPEAN STABILITY INITIATIVE,
HOW PEOPLE LIVE: SOUTH MITROVICA, CASH INCOME: SOUTH MITROVICA, at http://www.esi-
web.orgpdf/esimitrovica-economy-id_3.pdf (last visited Nov. 13, 2004). These cash tables are based
on eighteen months of empirical research undertaken by ESI and the Lessons Learned and Analysis
Unit of UNMIK.
4. A POST-INDUSTRIAL FUTURE?, supra note 1, at 5.
5. Id. at 4 (citing UNMIK, ADMIN. DEP'T OF LABOR & EMPLOYMENT, MITROVICE: THE BRIDGE
TO THE FUTURE, MICROENTERPRISES: SITUATION AND PERSPECTIVES (Feb. 2001) (on file with the
Ministry of Labour & Social Welfare archive in Pristina)).
6. Id. at 6 tbl.7; EUROPEAN STABILITY INITIATIVE, How PEOPLE LIVE: NORTH MITROVICA AND
ZVECAN, CASH INCOME: NORTH MITROVICA AND ZVECAN, at http://www.esiweb.org/pdf/esi-mit-
rovica_economy-id_2.pdf (last visited Nov. 13, 2004) [hereinafter How PEOPLE LIVE: NORTH
MITROVICA AND ZVECAN]. These cash tables are based on eighteen months of empirical research
undertaken by ESI and the Lessons Learned and Analysis Unit of UNMIK.
7. A POST-INDUSTRIAL FUTURE?, supra note 1, at 6 tbl.7; HOw PEOPLE LIVE: NORTH
MITROVICA AND ZVECAN, supra note 6.
8. A POST-INDUSTRIAL FUTURE?, supra note 1, at 5.
9. ld.; How PEOPLE LIVE: NORTH MITROVICA AND ZVECAN, supra note 6.
10, A POST-INDUSTRIAL FUTURE?, supra note 1, at 2 tbl.2 (citing 1991 Yugoslav Census Data).
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Mitrovica has become known for its division and ethnic clashes. The latest
outbreak of violence in Mitrovica on March 17-18, 2004, triggered ethnic
clashes across Kosovo, leaving 19 dead, 730 homes and 29 churches and
monasteries damaged or destroyed, and over 4,000 Serb and other minori-
ties internally displaced. I I
Mitrovica is a microcosm for all of Kosovo. If present trends continue,
Mitrovica will be a dead town. Mitrovica's division and unresolved politi-
cal status reinforce its social and economic crisis and fuel ethnic tensions.
Most international attention and resources have been spent on maintaining
the status quo and paying for soldiers, policemen, and an expensive interna-
tional administration. Too few funds have been spent on development. Too
little effort has been made to find a lasting solution for the Mitrovica prob-
lem that takes into account fears and concerns on both sides. The uncer-
tainty over Mitrovica's future keeps the town trapped in a downward spiral.
The same is true for Kosovo.
Five years after NATO's bombing campaign successfully ended the
ethnic cleansing of the Albanian population by Serb police and paramilita-
ries, ethnic tensions resurfaced, and NATO troops and the U.N. suddenly
found themselves caught in the cross fire between angry young crowds,
groups of Albanian extremists, and the beleaguered Serb community. For a
brief moment the world turned its attention back to Kosovo. The rooms at
the famous Grand Hotel on Mother Theresa Street were booked, and sev-
eral high-level delegations, including Chris Patten, Javier Solana, the
NATO Secretary-General, and the French Foreign Minister passed through
Pristina, the dusty capital and home to about 300,000 inhabitants. The vio-
lence reminded international media and policymakers of the Kosovo prob-
lem-a unique combination of an unresolved political status and a looming
social and economic crisis. The impressive achievement of rebuilding Kos-
ovo immediately after the war and establishing more or less multiethnic
governing institutions from scratch in only a few years seemed in sham-
bles. Official and unofficial statements of diplomats, politicians, and ana-
lysts echoed uncertainty, a sense of failure, and a lack of vision. The
atmosphere in Pristina, Brussels, and Washington was full of doubts. Can
there ever be a true multiethnic Kosovo? Will Kosovo be divided along
ethnic lines? Will Kosovo remain an international protectorate forever?
The long-term vision for Kosovo is clear: the future of Kosovo lies in
Europe. Even this no-man's-land, run by a U.N.-appointed Special Repre-
11. Press Release, United Nations Interim Mission in Kosovo, SRSG's Address to the Kosovo
Assembly (Apr. 9, 2004), available at http://www.unmikonline.org/press/2004/pressr/pr I 164.pdf.
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sentative, protected by NATO troops, and policed by a force composed of
forty-eight different nationalities, will one day join the EU.
The two main challenges facing Kosovo today are the continued po-
litical uncertainty over Kosovo's future status and a serious economic de-
velopment challenge. The example of Mitrovica demonstrates the human
and political costs of failing to address these problems now. Just like main-
taining the status quo in Mitrovica will inevitably lead to further economic
decline and more violence in the future, the Kosovo problem can no longer
be put on "standby mode."
Local political leaders and the EU need to take the lead and seriously
engage in the double challenge of state building and economy building.
The Kosovo leadership needs to offer a credible and realistic proposal to
the Serb community living in Kosovo and engage in direct negotiations
with Belgrade immediately. Kosovo leaders need to show that they under-
stand the fears and concerns of the Serb community and both sides, Pristina
and Belgrade, need to work hard on reaching a compromise agreement
addressing the issue of returns, property rights, and the future role of Serbia
in Kosovo. The EU needs to offer a credible strategy and the necessary
resources to address the deepening social and economic crisis.
Serious efforts need to be made by domestic and international actors
to turn the major setback of March 2004 into an opportunity. In fact, Mi-
trovica holds the keys to success or failure. A significant breakthrough in
returns, property restitution, and transforming the role of the Republic of
Serbia in Kosovo from parallel government to long-term donor in Mi-
trovica could prepare the ground for real progress Kosovo-wide.
In February 2004, the European Stability Initiative ("ESI") presented a
package proposal to local leaders composed of three elements: full resolu-
tion of property rights and restoration of freedom of movement in 2004, the
development of a joint development and assistance strategy for the Mi-
trovica region, and the redrawing of municipal boundaries to create a ma-
jority Serb but multiethnic North Mitrovica and Zvecan municipality.'
2
This proposal has been discussed and presented to Albanian, Serb, and
international leaders, and it has received the support of the Contact Group
and many senior politicians on both sides. By making such a proposal, the
Albanian leadership would prove its commitment to creating conditions for
the Serb community to live and integrate fully in Kosovo. By accepting
such a proposal, especially the return of Albanians north of the Ibar River,
the Serb leadership would show its commitment to accepting and support-
12. EUROPEAN STABILITY INITIATIVE, PEOPLE OR TERRITORY?: A PROPOSAL FOR MITROVICA 2
(Feb. 16, 2004), at http://www.esiweb.org/pdf/esi-document-id-50.pdf.
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ing the authority of the Kosovo governing institutions, including the police
service, the judiciary, and municipal structures. By engaging in direct nego-
tiations with Belgrade on the future of Serbia as a strategic donor in Kos-
ovo, the Albanian leadership in Pristina would actually prove its political
maturity and rebuild the trust and confidence with the international com-
munity. In February, ESI predicted that a failure to solve the Mitrovica
problem as an absolute priority would result in more violence in the future,
and would actually pave the way for the partition of Kosovo. Unfortu-
nately, the events of March 17 and 18 confirmed ESI's prediction.
The immediate security response in the wake of the recent violence is
not enough. The international response to send more troops and step up
arrests of extremist elements is crucial, but it needs to be complemented by
a clear political and economic vision. The political vision for Kosovo is an
undivided, democratic, multiethnic, sovereign state firmly anchored in
European structures and institutions, extending the maximum amount of
protection and rights to its minority communities. The economic vision for
Kosovo is a functioning market economy integrated regionally and with
Europe, slowly catching up with Greece, Portugal, and Slovenia with the
help of EU development funds.
EU membership is the only credible future strategy for Kosovo and
the region. The risk of further instability in Kosovo is a matter of deep
concern to the EU and we cannot allow the process to slip back into
"standby mode." The example of Mitrovica shows that freezing the conflict
by maintaining the status quo only fuels further ethnic tensions and actually
makes the situation worse.
The EU has committed itself politically to bringing Kosovo closer to
Europe. Already today, European institutions and member states are by far
the largest donor and contribute the bulk of international troops in Kosovo.
At a speech in Belgrade in April last year, the President of the European
Commission, Romano Prodi, reaffirmed that the historic process of
Europe's unification will not be complete until the countries of the Balkans
join the Union, stating "[w]e want you to become members of the Union-
with no 'ifs' and no 'buts.", 3
The rhetoric of "Europeanisation" underlies many programs in Kos-
ovo, including the "standards before status" document. 14 The weakness of
13. Romano Prodi, Speech at the South Eastern European Cooperation Process Summit (Apr. 9,
2003), in NEWS UPDATE (Delegation of the European Comm'n, Skopje, the former Yugoslavian Repub-
lic of Skopje), Apr. 11, 2003, at 1, at http://www.dclmkd.cec.cu.int/en/information-sources/new-
leters/electronic/2003/EC%20News%20Updatc%20Special%20Edition,%2011 %20April%202003.pdf.
14. See U.N. Interim Mission in Kosovo, Standards for Kosovo, UNMIK/PR/1078 (Dec. 10,
2003), at http://www.unmikonline.org/press/2003/pressr/pr1078.pdf.
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the "standards before status" process, however, is its unclear outcome and a
list of benchmarks that are difficult to measure. The promise of a possible
review date and the beginning of status negotiations in mid-2005 is too
vague to galvanize the political support that is needed to make difficult
political choices. Clear and measurable benchmarks are needed. Data on
returns and property restitution in each municipality, for example, could be
made public on a monthly basis. The same goes for crime statistics, in par-
ticular crimes directed against minorities. This would create benchmarks
that can actually be measured and public information that can be openly
discussed. It would also serve as a tool to identify model municipalities,
best practices, and areas that need significant improvement.
The "standards before status" process, however, should not single
Kosovo out as an anomaly. In fact, the standards reflect European criteria
and preconditions and as such are also applied to Croatia, Macedonia, and
Serbia. In the conclusions of the Thessaloniki Council in June 2003, the EU
stressed that "the pace of further movement of the Western Balkan coun-
tries towards the EU lies in their own hands and will depend on each coun-
try's performance in implementing reforms."' 15 Each country will be
reviewed and judged on its own merits. In order to create a real incentive
for the Kosovo government to comply with EU criteria, the "standards
before status" process should thus be transformed into a "standards for
status" process. The very "final status" of Kosovo has to be a democratic
and economically sustainable member state of the EU, safeguarding minor-
ity rights, upholding the rule of law, and adhering to core European values.
The ultimate responsibility lies with the Kosovo leadership. But the EU has
the experience and the means to help Kosovo reach this goal.
The EU might need to rethink its existing institutional tools. Existing
instruments, such as the European Agency for Reconstruction and the EU
Pillar as part of UNMIK, are insufficient to take on the task of helping
Kosovo along. The recent appointment of Fernando Gentilini as special EU
envoy by Javier Solana on March 29 is a first step in the right direction. 16
The extension of a European Partnership program to Kosovo marked an-
other important step. 17 The partnership document clearly states that its aim
15. European Commission, General Affairs & External Relations Council, The Thessaloniki
Agenda for the Western Balkans, at http://europa.eu.int/comm/extemal-relations/see/gacthess.htm (June
16, 2003).
16. INST. OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS, BALKANS UPDATE 2 (June 7, 2004), at http://www.iiea.com/-
files/BalkansUpdate7.pdf.
17. Council Decision 2004/520/EC of 14 June 2004 on the Principles, Priorities and Conditions
Contained in the European Partnership with Serbia and Montenegro Including Kosovo as Defined by
the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 of 10 June 1999, 2004 O.J. (L. 227) 21, 21 [here-
inatter Council Decision 2004/520/EC]. This extension is also defined by United Nations Security
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is "to ensure a stable future for a secure, democratic, and multi-ethnic Kos-
ovo" with its place in Europe.' 8 These are important steps, but there needs
to be more.
An additional factor hampering Kosovo's development is a crisis of
political representation as a result of Kosovo's unresolved political status.
The U.N. administration is above the democratic process, because its offi-
cials do not feel accountable to the people of Kosovo but to the capitals and
institutions paying their salaries. At the same time, the overall responsibil-
ity of UNMIK, as ultimate arbiter enshrined in the Security Council Reso-
lution 1244,19 continues to shield Kosovo's nascent political institutions
from real responsibility. They can afford to live in a comfortable limbo of
demanding more competencies while not fully exercising those already
transferred. Even in areas like education, health policy, and tax administra-
tion, a complete transfer of powers and responsibilities has not necessarily
translated into more local policy initiatives or creative reforms. Kosovo
politicians are allowed to get away with this, because most voters do not
yet hold their own politicians accountable for economic development, so-
cial reforms, or the provision of health care. Most reform legislation in
Kosovo is actually drafted by foreign experts, and a number of officials
seem to enjoy the well-established blame-game between UNMIK and the
Kosovo institutions, with both parties unwilling to take full responsibility.
The end result is total confusion and a severe crisis of political repre-
sentation. An extensive survey done by the United Nations Development
Programme in 2003 on perceptions of local government revealed the extent
of confusion of Kosovo citizens over who is responsible for what and who
can be held accountable. 20 The complexity of Kosovo's existing govern-
ance structures have left the public, at best, bewildered and, at worst, dis-
enchanted. For each service, UNMIK is held responsible by 5-30% of
respondents. 21 Even in clearly transferred competencies such as pension
payments, health care, and education, approximately 10% of Kosovars hold
UNMIK responsible. 22 Consequently, the gap dividing the public from both
UNMIK and Kosovo institutions and the mistrust felt towards democratic
institutions is growing. In Mitrovica, matters are even worse. In fact, North
Council Resolution 1244. S.C. Res. 1244, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 401 lth mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244
(1999).
18. Council Decision 2004/520/EC, supra note 17, at 31.
19. S.C. Res. 1244, supra note 17, 10-11.
20. See UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, THE KOSOvO MOSAIC: PERCEPTIONS OF LOCAL
GOVERNMENT AND PUBLIC SERVICES IN Kosovo (Mar. 2003), at http://undg.ks.undp.org/mos-
aic/data/FullReportEng.zip.




Mitrovica is the only place in Kosovo without democratically elected mu-
nicipal officials. The democratic deficit could not be more apparent.
Clear-cut competencies and lines of authority are needed. Kosovo in-
stitutions need to be held accountable for their actions by their own elector-
ate, and progress needs to be measured against actions-not words. The
same is true for Serb leaders in Kosovo. They need to feel accountable to
the Serb community in Kosovo and not to Belgrade.
A point in fact is domestic security. Holding Kosovo authorities re-
sponsible for their failure to immediately condemn the violence on the first
day of the March unrests is justified. Holding them accountable for the
failure of KFOR 23 and police to restore order and protect lives and
churches is unjust, because these competencies remain fully reserved in the
hands of UNMIK. In order to measure the sincerity and commitment of the
Kosovo leadership to protect all citizens irrespective of ethnicity against
violence and discrimination, local authorities and the Kosovo Police Ser-
vice have to be clearly responsible. There needs to be a clear command
structure with an identifiable leadership that can be held personally and
politically accountable. Indeed, there needs to be a Kosovo Ministry of
Interior with a clear mandate for domestic security working in partnership
with KFOR and UNMIK police.
Addressing these manifold challenges requires a serious international
and local engagement. In the wake of the recent violence, solving the Mi-
trovica dilemma must be an immediate priority for the Kosovo leadership
and the international community. As Kosovo's microcosm, Mitrovica is the
ultimate testing ground for the willingness of the Kosovo Albanian and
Serb leadership to reach a locally negotiated compromise solution.
At the outset of direct negotiations between Pristina and Belgrade, the
international community has to set out two guiding principles: (1) a final
settlement needs to be based on an agreement accepted by both sides and
(2) the option of partition along ethnic or territorial lines must be ruled out
from the start. The Contact Group and the EU should announce this explic-
itly and firmly reject all demands for a territorial solution to the problem of
minorities in Kosovo. This is a precondition to bringing all partners around
the negotiating table. Partition is clearly the least favored option by the
international community; it is unacceptable to the Albanian majority, and it
is an indirect call on Serbs living south of the Ibar River in Kosovo to pack
their things and go. Partition only rewards those who want ethnically
"clean" regions.
23. "KFOR" is short for "Kosovo Force," which refers to NATO troops in Kosovo.
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What is clear in Mitrovica is also true for the rest of Kosovo. Political
stability cannot be achieved without development. If Kosovo is not to re-
main an island of instability within the region, a serious economic devel-
opment agenda is key to stability. The political strategy needs to be
complemented by an economic strategy. The EU needs to help Kosovo
"catch up" with the rest of Europe.
Kosovo's development challenge is serious. Kosovo has the fastest
growing population in Europe. Estimates predict that 30,000 new jobs will
be needed each year for the next five years to accommodate the influx of
working-age youth.24 Real jobs are scarce. Only about 15% of the labor
force have an official job.2 5 By far the largest employer is agriculture, em-
ploying around 140,000.26 The agricultural sector is predominantly subsis-
tence agriculture characterized by extremely low productivity and average
land holdings of two hectares for families of nine. 27 Most farmers do not
produce for the market. In Viti municipality, a rural municipality in south-
east Kosovo bordering Macedonia, research by the Lessons Learned and
Analysis Unit draws a grim picture: only ninety-five out of a thousand in-
habitants have a secure income. 180 live off subsistence agriculture, 323
individuals are of working age but without a job, and 352 are under sixteen
or still in education.
28
These youngsters, mostly unskilled or inadequately skilled, are press-
ing on to a labor market that already shows signs of contraction. Already
12% of the population live in extreme poverty,29 as international funds are
declining and employment is dropping. The two main sources fuelling
Kosovo's short-lived postwar boom, donor money and remittances from
the Albanian diaspora abroad, have declined sharply over the past two
years. Economic indicators show a worrying trend: private consumption
has decreased as jobs are being cut, and investments in machinery and capi-
24. UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN Kosovo EUROPEAN UNION PILLAR, KOSOVO OUTLOOK 2004, al
11 (May 13, 2004), at http://www.esiweb.org/bridges/kosovo/1/1 3.pdf.
25. JANUSZ SZYRMER & ED FUNKIHOUSER, Kosovo ECONOMY IN 2002, at 4 (May 8, 2003), at
http://www.esiweb.org/bridges/kosovo/2/6.pdf [hereinafter SZYRMER & FUNKHOUSER].
26. ld. at 5.
27. PROVISIONAL INSTS. OF SELF-GOVERNMENT, MINISTRY OF AGRIC., FORESTRY & RURAL
DEV., THE Kosovo GREEN BOOK. A STRATEGY FOR SUSTAINABLE AGRICULTURAL AND RURAL
DEVELOPMENT IN KOsOVO 23-24 (May 2003), at http://www.esiweb.org/bridges/kosovo/4/15.pdf
28. Verena Knaus, Senior ESI analyst, Kosovo and the Outside World, Address at the IREX
Seminar held in Pristina (Apr. 2004). The figures are based on several months of intense field research
on the local economies in Viti and Gjilan municipality by the Lessons Learned and Analysis Unit of
ESI and the EU Pilliar of UNMIK.
29. 1 WORLD BANK POVERTY REDUCTION & ECON. MGMT. UNIT, KosoVo POVERTY




tal goods have decreased as well. Foreign investors are reluctant to invest
in Kosovo given the political uncertainties and Kosovo's comparative dis-
advantage. Despite an increase in domestic production, Kosovo continues
to run an import deficit close to one billion euros. 30 Estimates of GDP per
capita range from 690 to 1,200 euros annually. 31 There is a real risk that
Kosovo will fall behind even more.
However, the economic and social challenge facing Kosovo is not
fundamentally different from those which the EU has been dealing with in
Ireland, Greece, and the new member states joining on May 1, 2004. For
several decades, the EU has been developing the tools needed to tackle
structural economic and social problems in less developed regions within
the EU. The EU explicitly recognized that wide social and economic dis-
parities are intolerable within a real community. The structural and cohe-
sion funds as key development tools to help underdeveloped regions catch
up with the European common market are the core of the EU.
32
The term "cohesion" first came into use in the late 1980s. In Article
158 of the Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European
Community, there is an explicit commitment to promote "harmonious de-
velopment" and to "reduce[e] disparities" between more and less developed
regions. 33 Within its current and future borders the EU, thus, explicitly
engages in a process of economy building involving fundamental structural
transformation that ultimately leads to real convergence. Ireland is a shin-
ing example of the impact of structural and cohesion funds. The Irish eco-
nomic miracle is the result of EU cohesion policies combined with sound
domestic policymaking, successfully attracting foreign investment. "Irish
GDP has risen from two thirds of the EU average when it joined in the
1970s to 118 percent today."'34 Ireland received seventeen billion pounds in
total EU support between 1989 and 2000.35
In essence, the EU structural and cohesion funds focus on three main
areas:
30. SZYRMER & FUNKHOUSER, supra note 25, at 9 tbl.5.
31. The lack of reliable statistics is an additional impediment to Kosovo's economic development.
The current estimates of GDP are based on multiple sources of educated guesswork, limited trade and
tax data, and other sectoral or micro studies. Given that Kosovo's actual population is also unknown-
estimates range from 1.75 to 2.4 million people-GDP per capita calculations are extremely difficult.
32. CONSOLIDATED VERSION OF THE TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY arts.
159-6 1,Nov. 10, 1997, O.J. (C 340) 173 (1997).
33. Id. at art. 158.
34. EUROPEAN STABILITY INITIATIVE, THE ROAD TO TI-IESSALONIKI" COHESION AND THE
WESTERN BALKANS 5 (Mar. 12, 2003), at http://www.esiweb.org/pdf/esi-documentid_44.pdf [herein-
after THE ROAD TO THESSALONIKI].
35. Id. (quoting RAY MAC SHARRY & PADRAIC WHITE, THE MAKING OF THE CELTIC TIGER: THE
INSIDE STORY OF IRELAND'S BOOM ECONOMY 154 (2000)).
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1. improving the physical infrastructure of the economy,
2. raising the level of human capital through enhancing skills
and education levels, and
3. directly assisting the private section with productivity-
enhancing instruments. 36
Kosovo's physical infrastructure suffers from years of neglect, under-
investment, destruction, and a very slow process of restructuring and re-
form. With one-third of the population under the age of fifteen and an
antiquated education system not responding to the needs of the market,
Kosovo also faces an enormous human resource challenge and serious
skills deficits. Mitrovica's industrial and economic collapse is repeated
across Kosovo. The former industries have largely collapsed, and the exist-
ing private sector consists mostly of small and microenterprises based
around the family unit engaging in trade, service, and construction activi-
ties. Without targeted assistance, the private sector cannot create the jobs
needed to employ Kosovo's young population. However, these problems
are not unique to Kosovo. The entire region needs to gain access to EU
development assistance modeled on the structural and cohesion funds.
What makes Kosovo unique is the extent of its social and economic crisis.
What distinguishes EU development strategies for old and new mem-
ber states from current EU assistance in Kosovo are the three guiding prin-
ciples of the EU structural and cohesion funds: additionality, development
planning, and partnership.37 Additionality means that EU funds are added
to domestically-financed public investments; there is no assistance without
local cofinancing. 38 Development planning foresees that each project is
embedded in long-term development programs developed by the recipient
country. The emphasis on local development planning guarantees that each
project is really tailored to local needs and reflects the best interests of the
recipient community. 39 Close partnership with the EU is key to the success
of a truly Kosovo-owned development plan.
Most importantly, the region needs financial commitments commen-
surate with the challenges faced by the countries of the Western Balkans
hoping for EU accession. "Pre-accession aid to the ten candidate states in
36. John Bradley, Address at the LLA/Wilton Park Conference, Building Capacity: Applying EU
Experience to the Western Balkans (May 14, 2003).
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Central and Eastern Europe is C3 billion annually." 40 The financial package
for Romania and Bulgaria in the first three years after admission to the EU
in 2007 foresees a total of 15 billion euros to be spent on agriculture, subsi-
dies for poor regions, and the strengthening of national administrations of
the two countries. 41 In comparison, the entire European Commission
budget for the countries of the Western Balkans in 2003 was just under 700
million euros.42 The budget of the European Agency for Reconstruction
earmarked for Kosovo in 2004 is just under 50 million euros. 43 The budget
of the EU Pillar responsible for economic development within UNMIK in
2004 is no more than twenty-one million euros. 44 This is clearly not enough
for Kosovo.
Other countries in South Eastern Europe are suffering from the conse-
quences of deindustrialization, and other regions are suffering from unre-
solved ethnic tensions. But nowhere has the combination of the two
produced a social and economic crisis as severe as in Kosovo. Nowhere
else is a failure by the international community to act as dangerous as in the
divided city of Mitrovica. Europe needs to focus its attention and resources
to the last remaining powder keg in the region.
Now is also the time for local politicians to send a dramatic signal to
the outside world, in particular to Brussels. Europe needs to be convinced
that Kosovo is serious about its commitment to multiethnicity, democracy,
and future EU membership. The Kosovo leadership needs to show that it is
willing to find compromise solutions that answer the real needs of Kosovo.
There are no alternatives. If Mitrovica can be solved, Kosovo can be
solved; if Mitrovica fails, Kosovo could become Europe's West Bank.
40. EUROPEAN STABILITY INITIATIVE, WESTERN BALKANS 2004: ASSISTANCE, COHESION AND
THE NEW BOUNDARIES OF EUROPE 14 (Nov. 3, 2002), at http://www.esiweb.org/pdf/esi-doc-
ument id_37.pdf.
41. Oana Lungescu, Brussels Plans Bulgaria-Romania Aid, BBC NEWS, Feb. 9, 2004, at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3473369.stm (last modified Feb. 9, 2004).
42. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, GENERAL BUDGET OF THE EUROPEAN UNION FOR THE FINANCIAL
YEAR 2003: THE FIGURES 10 (Jan. 2003), at http://europa.eu.int/comm./pdf/bud-
get/syntchif2003/en.pdf.
43. EUROPEAN AGENCY FOR RECONSTRUCTION IN KoSovo, QUARTERLY REPORT TO THE
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT (Apr.-June 2004), available at http://www.ear.eu.int/publications/mainl-
news-alc2s3.htm.
44. This numbcr has been provided to the author by the Head of Finance of the EU Pillar of
UNMIK.
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